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At birth, human individuals do not speak any language but the developmental process leading 
to full linguistic mastery is rapid leading some scholars to say that we ordinarily have a full 
mastery of language (barring vocabulary limitations) by the age of four or five (Pinker, 1994). 
The development of language is one of the most important cognitive developments that humans 
undergo and that raises the question of how it takes place. For example, is learning central to 
the process or are there bodies of language specific innate knowledge that obviate the need for 
learning? One particular aspect of this question will be the ultimate focus of this chapter: how 
do children come to grasp the meanings of the words that belong to their vocabularies? 
 
Knowledge of Language  
One natural way of viewing linguistic mastery is to see it as being based on knowledge of 
language (Chomsky, 1986). For example, I am able to communicate by means of English 
sentences because I possess the relevant knowledge of English and this includes, semantic, 
syntactic, morphological, phonological and pragmatic knowledge. How do children  develop 
such linguistic  knowledge? Recent decades have seen an explosion in the empirical study of 
language development (see Ambridge and Lieven (2011) for helpful comprehensive survey). A 
key aspect of the debate has concerned the question of whether language is something that is 
learned by means of domain general learning mechanisms or whether it has a substantial innate 
basis that is specific to language. 
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The concept of innateness looms large in debates about language acquisition and this raises 
the question of what it is for something to be innate. Unfortunately, the traditional 
characterisation of innateness in terms of presence at birth is problematic                                                     
for two reasons. First, there are characteristics that are innate that are not present at birth but 
emerge in the course of development such as secondary sexual characteristics like pubic hair 
and breasts. Second, the notion of in utero learning is hardly incoherent. In fact, there is 
evidence that the developing foetus is sensitive to language spoken by its mother and learns on 
the basis of this. For example, in an experiment conducted by De Casper and Spence (1986) 
pregnant women repeatedly read aloud a particular story. After birth the children of these 
women were played recordings of their mother reading that very story. They were also played 
recordings of their mother reading new stories of a similar length and intonation pattern. The 
children displayed a clear preference for the story that their mother had read whilst pregnant 
suggesting that they had a familiarity with it gained from before they were born. This 
preference was indicated by their sucking whilst breastfeeding more enthusiastically when 
listening to the story that their mother had read whilst pregnant. 
In the light of this how should we characterise innateness? As a rough and ready 
characterisation, for something to be innate is for it not to be learned and for it to be a feature 
of the organism at the beginning of its existence or for it to emerge reliably from that initial 
state in the normal course of development. 
 
Syntax 
By far and away the most prominent debate in the recent study of language development relates 
to the development of syntactic knowledge, knowledge of how to put together words to build 
more complex structures such as phrases and sentences. And by far and away the most 
prominent contribution to that debate is constituted by the work of Noam Chomsky who since 
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the late 1950s has been developing and defending a theory according to which our knowledge 
of syntax has a substantial innate basis. (See Chomsky (2016) for a recent accessible statement 
of his perspective.) 
For Chomsky the mind-brain is made up of a number of functionally distinct yet interacting 
components that are akin to the internal organs of the body. These components are part of our 
biological endowment and they develop in a manner that is constrained and directed by our 
shared genetic makeup. One such component is the language faculty, a mental system that 
underlies language development and use. The initial state of the language faculty, its state 
before being subject to any linguistic input, encodes Universal Grammar (UG for short). UG 
is a system of syntactic rules or principles common to all human languages. It constitutes a 
template for language and constrains the form that any human language can take. That is not 
to say that all human languages are syntactically indistinguishable and as a consequence  
children do not have an innate knowledge of any particular spoken language. However, a child's 
language specific knowledge at birth is such that she only requires quite limited information to 
acquire a full knowledge of the local language she ends up speaking, a knowledge that is 
encoded in the mature state of her language faculty. 
Chomsky’s primary argument for this nativist perspective is the poverty of the stimulus 
argument. According to this argument, children typically acquire a complete knowledge of the 
syntax of their first language by the age of four or five. However, the experiences they have of 
language in the first few years of their lives are far too impoverished to have facilitated learning 
from scratch so they must have had language specific innate knowledge to aid the 
developmental process. Their linguistic experiences are impoverished in several respects. First, 
the language that they hear contains many grammatical errors (Chomsky, 1972). Second, many 
of the sentences that a child would need to hear to learn the syntactic rules of her language, 
particularly complex sentences, are rarely encountered. Third, children don’t generally receive 
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negative data, that is explicit information that the ungrammatical sentences that they produce 
are ungrammatical (Pinker, 1989).  
Chomsky’s views have dominated linguistics and cognitive science for several decades but 
recent years have seen something of a backlash. Probably the most prominent contemporary 
alternative to Chomsky’s linguistic nativism is constituted by an approach known as the usage-
based theory the key champion of which is Michael Tomasello. For Tomasello (2003; 2008) 
language is a system of communication that is both used and learned in a social context; for 
him there is no such thing as the language faculty or UG.  
Tomasello is committed to an approach in linguistics known as construction grammar. A 
construction is “symbolic unit with meaning” (Tomasello, 2003: 160). Hence any concrete 
word or sentence such as ‘aardvark’ or ‘the aardvark ate a termite’ is a construction. But as 
concrete sentences exemplify more abstract forms the following are also constructions: 
 
• X ate a termite 
• X ate Y 
• TRANSITIVE-SUBJECT TRANSITIVE VERBed TRANSITIVE-OBJECT 
 
For Tomasello, a language is an inventory of constructions that is learned in a gradual and 
piecemeal manner beginning with concrete words and sentences and moving on to increasingly 
abstract constructions. Constructions, even the most abstract ones, differ from the rules and 
principles that lie at the heart of Chomsky’s vision in that they are inherently meaningful; for 
example, “the pattern X VERBed Y the Z is a construction of English that signifies some transfer 
of possession (either literal or metaphorical)” (Tomasello 2003: 99). Thus, Tomasello’s 
approach doesn’t involve drawing a firm distinction between syntax and semantics and, 
accordingly, accounts for semantic development just as much as syntactic development.  
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For Tomasello the language learning process begins at about age one when the child has 
developed certain key perceptual and cognitive capacities. The first of these involves the 
possession of basic concepts and the ability to represent a viewed scene in terms of those 
concepts. This capacity would be utilised when, for example, seeing a person throw a ball to 
someone else, a child conceptualises the scene as having three participants (two people and a 
ball) and involving one of the people acting on the ball so as to transfer its possession to the 
other. The second capacity is that of recognising patterns exemplified in items of data that differ 
at the concrete level. The third capacity is that of having sophisticated mind-reading skills.  
This capacity involves being able to discern the higher-order mental states of other people, 
where a higher-order mental state is a mental state the having of which involves attributing a 
mental state to someone (as when you believe that I believe that aardvarks eat termites and 
when I believe that you believe that I believe that aardvarks eat termites). Higher-order mental 
states are central to the phenomenon of joint attention when two people are not only attending 
to the same thing but are mutually aware that they share that attention. 
The key thing about these capacities is that though they are not specifically linguistic they 
can be brought together so as to facilitate the learning of language in the following manner. 
From infancy children participate in routinized activities with their carers such as being fed, 
being dressed, playing, and so. In this context the child and carer will often jointly attend to an 
element of the viewed scene and employ language. For example, suppose a child in the early 
stages of language learning and an adult are playing with a ball and the adult hides the ball 
behind her back and says “ball gone.” The fact that the pair have been jointly attending to the 
ball whilst playing a familiar game and that they mutually know that the ball has disappeared 
from view enables the child to work out that the adult intends to say that the ball has 
disappeared. Now suppose a cat that has been sleeping in the corner of the room noisily stirs 
and slinks out of the room. The adult looks at the cat, turns to the child and then returns to 
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watching the cat thereby establishing joint attention of the cat with the child. The adult then 
says “cat gone.” Given the evidence, the child can easily work out that this phrase means that 
the cat has disappeared.  
At this stage the child knows the meaning of two distinct sentences but doesn’t appreciate 
the connections between them. This changes when she applies her pattern recognition skills to 
the sentences. For, she recognises that both sentences talk about something disappearing and 
contain the component “gone.” This enables her to work out that “gone” relates to 
disappearance and in a similar manner she can work out the meaning  of “cat” and “ball.” 
Moreover, by reflecting on the similarities between distinct sentences she can recognise that 
distinct sentences can exemplify a common pattern. For example, both “ball gone” and “cat 
gone” have the form “X gone.” Realising this, the child stores the construction “X gone” 
representing it as meaning that X, whatever it is, has disappeared. This construction can then 
be used in building and understanding sentences that the child has not encountered once she 
has learned the meaning of further words such as “dog”, “man” and the like. In this manner the 
child can gradually add more constructions to her store of linguistic knowledge moving 
towards increasingly abstract constructions. What is noteworthy about this process is that 
learning the meaning of words and that of larger abstract structures goes hand in hand and is 
mutually supportive.  
 
Vocabulary development  
Chomsky’s nativism relates to syntax and at first appearances it might seem that there is no 
mileage in extending a nativist perspective to vocabulary development for several reasons. 
First, suppose that we adopt the standard view that a word is a pairing of a sound and a meaning 
so that when a person has a particular word in their vocabulary they know that the relevant 
sound-meaning pairing holds in their linguistic community. Clearly, languages vary widely in 
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how they pair sounds and meanings and that is why it is difficult to understand speakers of 
another language even when the thoughts they express by means of their words are very 
familiar. It seems uncontentious that such sound-meaning pairings are matters of convention 
that need to be learned if they are to be known. Second, vocabulary development is a much 
longer process than syntactic development and cannot plausibly be characterised as complete 
by age five; indeed we add to our vocabularies throughout our lives. This seems to leave plenty 
of time for learning thereby suggesting that poverty of the stimulus considerations are not at 
work. Third, although adult speakers of any given language will have vocabularies that overlap 
there will also be a lot of divergence reflecting differences in experience.  
Nevertheless, I think that there is something important that is innate with respect to 
vocabulary development and this has to do with the meaning side of the sound-meaning 
pairing. To appreciate this it is necessary to take a step back and reflect on the question of what 
meanings are and on the challenge that children face when working out the meaning of a newly 
encountered word. 
Concepts are the ingredients of thoughts. For example, one cannot entertain the thought that 
all aardvarks eat termites unless one has the concepts ALL, AARDVARK, EAT and TERMITE. As 
thoughts exist in the mind then so do concepts. Concepts correspond to categories, be they 
categories of thing, event, state, process, or whatever. A concept is at least partly individuated 
in terms of the particular category that it corresponds to and it serves to pick out or represent 
that category. Accordingly, the content of a concept is at least partly a matter of which category 
it represents. Hence, for example, the concept AARDVARK has the content aardvark because it 
picks out or represents the category of aardvarks.  
There is a close relationship between language and thought: we use sentences to 
communicate our thoughts and come to appreciate what others think on the basis of 
understanding the sentences that they produce. For this to be the case there needs to be a close 
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relationship between the contents of our thoughts and the meaning of the sentences that we use 
to express them.  
Thought is compositional in that the content of a thought is determined by the content of its 
component concepts and the way that they are put together. Similarly, linguistic meaning is 
compositional in that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meaning of its component 
words and how they are put together. The implication of this is that the meaning of the words 
we use in communicating our thoughts must align with the contents of the concepts that make 
up those thoughts. From this insight it is a small step to the conclusion that word meanings are 
concepts in the respect that the meaning of a word for an individual (or a linguistic community) 
is a matter of the identity of the concept the individual (or members of the community) 
associates with the sound half of the sound-meaning pairing that constitutes the word. So, for 
example, “aardvark” means aardvark for me (or my linguistic community) because I (or most 
members of my linguistic community) associate the sound I vocalise when I say ‘aardvark’ 
with the concept AARDVARK.  
Associating a sound with a concept is itself a mental state. This mental state of associating 
a particular sound with a particular concept involves employing a mental representation of the 
sound in question and the mental representation that constitutes the concept in question. 
Linguists sometimes label this in-head store of an individual’s knowledge of the words of her 
language, how they sound and what they mean, a mental lexicon (Aitchison, 2012). Thus, 
vocabulary development involves adding items to the mental lexicon.  
Many researchers of language development refer to a thought experiment developed by the 
philosopher W.V. Quine (1960) to show that children face a substantial challenge in learning 
new words (Bloom 2000). Quine imagined a linguist attempting to translate the language of an 
isolated tribe. He witnesses a member of the tribe utter “gavagai” whilst pointing at a rabbit. 
How should “gavagai” be translated? Quine points out that there are many competing 
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hypotheses that are equally consistent with the evidence. For example, for all the linguist can 
tell, “gavagai” could mean rabbit, undetached part of a rabbit, time slice of a rabbit, rabbit 
flea, or any one of infinitely many other possibilities. Quine ultimately draws the conclusion 
that words don’t have determinate meanings but that is not the moral that psychologists and 
linguists have tended to draw from his reflections. Rather, they have assumed that children do 
succeed in learning words and so somehow overcome the challenge that Quine so vividly 
describes.  
This raises the question of how children manage to overcome Quine’s challenge as the 
empirical evidence suggests that they do so from an early age. For a long time a child’s 
comprehension of the words of her language lags behind production (Griffiths, 1986) but even 
if we focus on production it is evident that vocabulary development proceeds at a heady rate. 
Most children produce their first word at about one year of age and by the time they are two 
they typically have a productive vocabulary of between 200 and 300 words. This vocabulary  
is dominated by nouns that pick out categories of objects (such as “dog”, “milk” and so on) but 
it also includes verbs, adjectives, and other types of words (Bloom et al, 1993). From this age 
children acquire on average 3.6 words per day giving rise to a vocabulary of over 2000 words 
at four years of age. Some researchers have claimed that at this age children are capable of fast 
mapping, that is learning a word on the basis of a single exposure to that word (Carey, 1978). 
In explaining how children overcome Quine’s challenge, some researchers have attributed 
to them biases that lead to them ruling out certain hypotheses that are in principle consistent 
with the data. These biases are often conceived as being innate but only operative in the early 
stages of language development. For example, Woodward and Markman (1998) postulate a 
whole object bias whereby children assume that nouns refer to whole objects rather than parts. 
Operating with this assumption would enable a child in Quine’s situation to discount 
undetached rabbit part as a possible meaning for “gavagai.” 
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Even if children have biases to help them narrow down the possible meanings of new words 
they encounter, they still need appropriate concepts in order to represent any possibilities they 
consider. This is clear from Tomasello’s account of language learning; the child attempting to 
learn what ‘ball’ or ‘ball gone’ means in the manner he describes must have have a prior grasp 
of concepts that enable her to represent the communicative intentions of the adult producing 
those words. In the case of that example, those concepts would be BALL and DISSAPEAR. 
That raises the question of how those concepts are acquired: are they learned or are they innate? 
Suppose that we have to learn what the words of our language mean (what sound-meaning 
pairings hold in our linguistic community). It is still consistent with this that the concepts that 
we combine with sounds in building our vocabularies are innate. I’m not seriously suggesting 
that all of the concepts for which we have words are innate; no doubt we learn plenty of them. 
However, what I will argue is that there is a stock of abstract concepts needed to make language 
learning possible that belong to our innate endowment. 
 
Abstract concepts 
The term “abstract” is ambiguous. In one respect, an abstract concept is one that is general 
rather than just referring to a particular; for example, the concept AARDVARK is abstract in 
that it applies to many distinct particular things (Gauker 2011; and Laurence and Margolis 
2012). There is a question about how we acquire concepts that are abstract in this sense as our 
experiences are always of particulars; I experience particular aardvarks rather than 
aardvarkness in general. In the second respect, an abstract concept is one that refers to 
something that cannot directly be perceived, something that doesn’t have a characteristic look, 
sound, taste, smell or feel. Arguably, the concept CAUSE is abstract in this sense. We might 
perceive a particular scene involving distinct objects, states or events and conceptualise them 
as being causally related. For example, I might perceive a striking of a match followed by a 
 11 
lighting of that match and take the former to be the cause of the latter. But I don’t perceive any 
causation; rather I apply the concept of causation in interpreting the nature of the relationship 
between the events I do perceive. 
My concern is with concepts that are abstract in this second sense. We have many abstract 
concepts and words in our vocabularies that have such concepts as their meaning. As well as 
the concept CAUSE concepts of mental states such as those of BELIEF, DESIRE and 
INTENTION are abstract. For, not only can we not directly perceive the mental states of 
another person but many of our own mental states are unconscious. Even when we do introspect 
one of our own mental states we so indirectly via an awareness of their internal effects such as 
their in-head vocalisation (Jakendoff, 2002, 2012). Another important abstract concept is that 
of an object in general, that is, the concept of something that continues to exist when it is not 
being perceived. Moral concepts such as RIGHT, WRONG, FAIR, UNJUST, and so on, are 
also abstract. 
How do we acquire abstract concepts? Within the empiricist tradition such concepts are 
generally portrayed as appearing relatively late in development with the implication that an 
infant’s conceptual scheme is very different from that of a typical adult being much less 
intellectually sophisticated. For example, Jean Piaget (1952; 1954), the founding father of 
developmental psychology, portrayed a child’s development as passing through several distinct 
stages of increasing sophistication that begins from a very meagre base such that a child in her 
early years would not even posses the concept of an object or be capable of logical thought. 
In recent years much work in developmental psychology has served to undermine Piaget’s 
views by suggesting that infants have a sophisticated perspective on reality as part of their 
innate endowment. For example, Elizabeth Spelke (1994), Susan Gelman (2003) and Susan 
Carey (2009) have argued that infants carve the world into distinct domains and utilise different 
abstract concepts and knowledge involving those concepts to deal with each of those domains. 
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These domains include those of  inanimate physical objects, minded agents, and biological 
entities. For example, Elizabeth Spelke (1994) argues that we have a core system of concepts 
and knowledge for dealing specifically with inanimate physical objects. Such concepts and 
knowledge are in place before a child has had any chance to learn it on the basis of her 
experiences suggesting that it is innate. A classic experiment supporting this kind of view was 
conducted by Karen Wynn (1992). Wynn’s experiment on five-month old infants involved a 
stage, two puppets and a screen. At first one puppet was placed on the stage in full view of the 
infants. Then a screen was lowered to hide the puppet from view and a second puppet was 
placed behind the screen, with the infants seeing this manoeuvre. Then the screen was lowered 
sometimes revealing one puppet and sometimes revealing two with each participating infant 
seeing both of these scenarios. Wynn employed measures of looking time to determine which 
of these scenarios most surprised or violated the expectations of the infants (the assumption 
being that if an infant looked longer at one of the scenarios than the other then that indicated 
that she was more surprised by it). What Wynn found was that the infants were more surprised 
when only one puppet was revealed rather than two. From this she concluded that the infants 
had an innate concept of an object as something that continues to exist over time when not 
being perceived and innate knowledge that the world is populated by such objects. 
In addition to inanimate physical objects, children have to deal with other people who are 
minded and act on the basis of their mental states. To do this they need a theory a mind that is 
made up of a body of concepts for mental states and knowledge about how mental states 
causally relate to one another, to external stimulation and to behaviour (Bloom, 2004; Epley, 
2014). There is considerable evidence that infants draw a distinction between people and 
inanimate physical objects very early in life and have different expectations concerning how 
they behave. For example, infants express surprise when an inanimate physical object moves 
without something external making contact with it but become disconcerted when a face that 
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was mobile suddenly becomes still (Tronick et al, 1978). Such data leads many psychologists 
to attribute to us an innate theory of mind (Spelke 2003;  Baillargeon et al 2010). 
Even with respect to putatively concrete concepts such as DOG and WATER, there is 
evidence that children take an abstract perspective on them. In particular, children are 
essentialists with respect to many of the categories for which they have concepts. That is, they 
regard the items that belong to such categories as being bound together in virtue of having a 
hidden essence, a collection of properties that makes them what they are and is causally 
responsible for their perceivable features (Keil 1989). Susan Gelman (2003) argues that 
children adopt this essentialist viewpoint before they begin school suggesting that it is part of 
an innate perspective on reality. 
Moral concepts are also abstract and research suggests that infants morally evaluate 
behaviour before the age of one. For example, Hamlin et al (2007) showed infants a little under 
one year of age a puppet show in which a duck tries to open a toy box with a heavy lid. Two 
bears then appear one of which attempts to help the duck open the box whereas the other 
attempts to hinder the duck. After the show the infants were given the opportunity to play with 
the bears and almost all of them chose to play with the kind bear suggesting that they had 
morally evaluated the behaviour of the bears and preferred one to the other on that basis.  
In short, there is considerable evidence that children have a body of innate abstract concepts 
and knowledge involving those concepts and that this is part and parcel of a metaphysical 
picture that carves the external world into different domains that work in different ways. 
How do such abstract concepts relate to vocabulary development? Many of these concepts 
do get lexicalised and the words corresponding to them enter the vocabularies of most speakers 
in the form of a relevant sound-meaning pairing. Now there is a respect in which that sound-
meaning pairing will have to be learned. For example, I had to learn how the concepts of 
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CAUSATION and BELIEF are conventionally expressed in English. But in order to learn this 
I didn’t have to learn the concepts CAUSATION and BELIEF.  
If the abstract concepts that I have highlighted are innate then there is another implication 
with respect to vocabulary development that can be brought out by returning to Tomasello’s 
theory of language learning. Tomasello portrays language learning from the beginning as 
drawing upon the child’s ability to mind-read and to conceive of the viewed scene in a manner 
that lines up with that of the adults with whom she is interacting. This requires having a 
metaphysical picture akin to that attributed to children by the developmental psychologists 
discussed above. In particular, it requires drawing a distinction between inanimate physical 
objects and minded individuals and conceiving of both of these in terms of abstract concepts 
such as that of an object that continues to exist when not perceived and of numerous 
psychological concepts. This metaphysical perspective and the concepts that are bound up with 
it is both needed to get the language learning process off the ground and is central to all further 
attempts to learn elements of language. In short, it is not a peripheral aspect of a child’s world 
view. 
 
Is it possible to learn abstract concepts? 
Is it possible that the kinds of abstract concepts that I have portrayed as being innate are in 
actual fact learned? There are some prominent attempts to explain how we can learn abstract 
concepts on the basis of our experiences and I will now consider two of these. 
Jesse Prinz (2002) has developed an influential theory of concepts – namely, the proxytype 
theory – according to which all concepts are constructed out of perceptual primitives. He 
addresses head on the challenge that this theory cannot deal with abstract concepts. He argues 
that on anyone’s account we apply abstract concepts to phenomena that we can perceive and 
do so on the basis of how we perceive them to be. This implies that perceivable properties 
 15 
correlate with abstract properties so that the instantiation of the latter can be detected on the 
basis of the instantiation of the former. He thinks that the upshot of this is that abstract 
properties can be expressed or encoded by means of perceptual representations.  
My objection to Prinz’s line of thought runs as follows. Suppose that we concede that a 
particular abstract property reliably correlates with certain perceptual ones. It wouldn’t follow 
from this that the abstract property could be expressed or encoded by means of perceptual 
representations. This is because the mere correlation of two properties x and y does not imply 
that in representing an object as a y one is thereby representing it as an x; in addition, one needs 
a distinct representation that facilitates representing the object as an x as such. This can be seen 
by considering a simple example. Suppose a person is familiar with a particular species of bird 
for which she has a concept. She notices that members of this species come in two colours, 
namely, black and brown. Unbeknownst to her the colour of the birds correlates with their sex, 
the black ones being male and the brown ones being female. Because of her lack of knowledge 
of the link between colour and sex she does not represent a bird of this species as being female 
in representing it as being brown. In other words, the mere correlation of sex and colour does 
not imply that in representing a bird as having a particular colour one is thereby representing 
its sex. Consequently, in order to represent a bird’s sex one needs a representation distinct from 
representations of colour. This undermines Prinz’s line of thought by suggesting that one 
cannot represent something as having a particular abstract property by merely perceptual means 
even if there is a correlation between that abstract property and certain perceptual properties. 
Therefore, Prinz has not shown how abstract concepts can be built out of perceptual resources 
and so learned on the basis of perception.  
A second attempt to explain how we learn abstract concepts on the basis of concrete 
concepts is suggested by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s treatment of metaphor (Lakoff 
and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987 ). According to Lakoff and Johnson metaphor is ubiquitous 
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in language and thought. In cases of metaphor we understand a concept or word on the basis 
of analogy with some more concrete concept. For, example, suppose a colleague says that they 
cannot join me for a coffee because they are currently bogged down answering a backlog of 
emails. I won’t understand them as been literally stuck in a bog and unable to move whilst on 
a walk through the countryside. But I will understand their situation as being analogous to that 
in that they are currently unable to extract themselves from their office until they have answered 
a large volume of emails. 
For Lakoff and Johnson not all of our concepts are metaphorical; rather, there is a stock of 
concepts that form the basis of our metaphors, that provide the analogies in terms of which the 
metaphors are understood. Such basic concepts relate to our perceptual experiences of the 
outside world and to our bodily experiences. For example, we often conceive of mental states 
in spatial and postural terms as when we say such things as: 
 
 “I’m feeling down today” to attribute a state of depression or a lack of enthusiasm.  
“She is walking with a spring in her step” to attribute a state of confidence, happiness or 
enthusiasm. 
“You should walk tall after your recent successes” to tell someone they should be proud of 
their achievements.  
 
This treatment of metaphor suggests one way of dealing with the charge that abstract 
concepts cannot be learned. The suggestion is that we learn such concepts on analogy with 
more concrete concepts relating to perceptual and bodily experiences. So for example, an 
individual could learn concepts for psychological states on the basis of a prior understanding 
of spatial concepts and concepts relating to posture and manner of locomotion.  
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I accept that metaphor is commonplace in language and that when we appreciate the aptness 
of a metaphorical expression we often do so by noting an analogy between two distinct 
domains. However, I am sceptical of the claim that metaphorical extension provides a reliable 
way of acquiring new abstract concepts. The basic problem is that one can only appreciate the 
aptness of the metaphor when one has a prior grasp of the concept expressed in metaphorical 
terms. For example, I appreciate the aptness of the expression “walk tall” as a term meaning 
proud because of my understanding that people who are proud often hold themselves very 
upright as opposed to those who are ashamed who often slouch. Similarly, I appreciate the 
aptness of “down” as a term for depression as I know that depressed people typically do not 
hold themselves upright and spend a large proportion of their time lying or sitting down and 
are difficult to coax into activity that involves them being physically up and active. In short, I 
have a theory about such psychological states and how they manifest themselves in behaviour 
and this theory enables me to understand and appreciate the metaphorical expressions. But 
having such a theory requires having the psychological concepts in question. In other words, 
prior possession of the target concept is necessary for appreciating the aptness of its 
metaphorical expression. Thus, if one didn't have the target concept, the metaphorical 
expression would appear opaque. This suggests that one cannot learn abstract concepts on the 
basis of a prior possession of more concrete concepts as without a grasp of the target abstract 
concepts one just would not be able to appreciate the relevant analogy. 
 
Conclusion 
Acquiring knowledge of language is one of the most important cognitive develops that we 
undergo as children. A key element of this development involves building a vocabulary each 
item of which consists of a pairing of a sound and a meaning that is represented in the mental 
lexicon. In this chapter I have discussed the question of how we acquire the meaning side of 
 18 
these pairings and have assumed that such meanings are constituted by concepts. I have argued 
that although learning does play an important role in vocabulary development in that we have 
to learn the conventions governing sound-meaning pairings that hold in our home linguistic 
communities, such learning is only possible because we have a battery of abstract concepts and 
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